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Abstract 
Based on a combination of quantitative analysis and a qualitative forward-looking approach, 
this paper assesses both the state of play and the future capacity of the EMU to respond and 
adapt to asymmetric shocks. The objective is to provide a basis upon which to gauge the 
potential value added of a European Unemployment Benefits Scheme (EUBS), against the 
background of the recent plans for the Banking Union, the Capital Markets Union and the 
reform of the fiscal governance framework. We find that the capacity of the system to deal 
with asymmetric shocks (and in principle reduce their occurrence) is likely to increase due to 
these changes, but it will remain limited in the medium term and certainly lower than in the 
US. We also argue that given the broad pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, the idea that national 
policies alone can deal alone with asymmetric shocks is not realistic. Lastly, we maintain that 
an ex-ante fiscal insurance mechanism can provide some degree of income smoothing and is 
likely to catalyse market insurance. Fiscal and market insurance can reduce the role of credit 
and borrowing, which until now has been the main channel for shock absorption in the euro 
area but also the least effective in times of crisis. We conclude that, from a macroeconomic 
point of view, an EUBS is a useful tool to improve shock absorption capacity and is not 
mutually exclusive with market risk sharing.     
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1. Introduction  
This paper seeks to assess both the general state of play and the future capacity of the euro 
area to smooth and absorb asymmetric shocks through various channels. The objective is to 
provide a basis for gauging the potential value added of European Unemployment Benefits 
Scheme against the background of the recent plans for further integration such as the 
Banking Union (BU) and Capital Markets Union (CMU), and the reform of the fiscal 
governance framework. In particular, we ask whether private risk sharing and domestic 
fiscal policy could be sufficient adjustment mechanisms to allow the E(M)U to effectively 
deal with shocks in the future. The assessment is based on a combination of quantitative 
analysis of the relevant adjustment channels and a qualitative forward-looking perspective. 
The starting point for this analysis is our contention that the discussion on the benefits of a 
future stabilisation device, such as the European Unemployment Benefits Scheme (EUBS), 
needs to be embedded in a broader debate: one that considers the role of different shock-
absorbing mechanisms. Indeed, in a monetary union, the impact of country-specific shocks 
can be absorbed via various channels, whether they are domestic, like fiscal policy and price 
adjustments, or international, namely cross-border mobility of workers and access to 
international financial markets.  
This paper focuses on the role played by the integration of financial markets and by domestic 
fiscal policy, in the framework of the EU governance architecture.  
The degree of development and integration of the financial system affects the working of 
capital and credit markets and their ability to function as shock absorbers to asymmetric 
shocks. Indeed shocks can be smoothed via: 
o International (spatial) risk sharing made possible through access to international capital 
markets; and 
o Consumption smoothing (or intertemporal risk sharing) through use of savings and access 
to international credit markets. 
                                                   
* Cinzia Alcidi is Head of the Economic Policy Unit and LUISS Research Fellow at CEPS. Gilles Thirion 
is a Researcher in the Economic Policy unit at CEPS. The authors are indebted to Daniel Gros for 
insightful conversations with him on the subject and thankful to Paul De Grauwe for his comments. 
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Domestic fiscal policy deals with asymmetric shocks through automatic stabilisers and, in 
principle, countercyclical discretionary spending to stabilise domestic income.  
These two areas have been the object of important changes recently, and both are likely to 
affect the shock absorption capacity of the E(M)U in the near future. However, the capacity 
to adapt and respond to shocks also depends on other factors: in particular, wage corrections 
and labour mobility. These involve adjustments in the labour markets and they become 
inevitable when an asymmetric shock is permanent.  
In the case of a supply shock, whether symmetric or asymmetric, changes in relative prices 
and production patterns are inevitable. While certain policies can provide temporary buffers 
and gain time, they cannot necessarily assure structural change. 1  
The original optimum currency area (OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961) identifies cross-border 
mobility of labour2 as a crucial adjustment mechanism to (long-lasting) asymmetric shocks. 
In the euro area, this channel seems to have worked only moderately. 
Lastly, as argued by Kenen (1969) in the case of monetary unions, where monetary policy is 
not anymore available to respond to asymmetric shocks, common fiscal resources can be an 
important complement to domestic fiscal policy. They can also be important is the case of 
symmetric shocks, as it is the case in the US. Various forms of transfers from the federal 
government to states generally exist in federations. Transfers can have: i) redistribution 
effects (permanent transfers from richer to poorer regions), and ii) insurance effects against 
country-specific macroeconomic shocks via temporary transfers (like a common 
unemployment insurance scheme), or iii) insurance effects against common shocks (inter-
temporal stabilisation under certain conditions).  
By assessing the effectiveness of different shock absorption mechanisms, we attempt to offer 
an overview of the resilience of the EMU to shocks that takes into account the recent 
governance developments and help understand if and which additional mechanisms are 
required. The question of how to enhance the EMU responsiveness to shocks is indeed 
particularly relevant in the current context where a number of official reports, including the 
recent Five President Report3, have referred to the introduction of economic stabilisers for 
the euro area. This is also important in the current political debate, which is divided between 
two opposing views. On the one hand, those who argue that the new integration efforts and 
governance changes will boost the functioning of market mechanisms for private risk 
sharing and restore the capacity of domestic fiscal policy to stabilise the economy against 
asymmetric shocks, hence making additional (supranational) fiscal tools unnecessary. On the 
other hand, those who argue that further financial integration will not be sufficient to ensure 
that market mechanisms deal in a proper way with the effects of asymmetric shocks and that 
it could even be a source of instability. In addition, given the member states’ poor track 
record in enforcing fiscal rules and the outstanding weaknesses in the EMU’s architecture, it 
remains unsure as to whether the new system of governance will be sufficient to allow 
                                                   
1 The investigation of this channel goes beyond the scope of this paper, for a more detailed analysis 
see among others, OECD (1999) and the role of labour markets in adapting to shocks. 
2 See Alcidi et al. (2016) on how an EUBS could affect the mobility of workers.  
3 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf 
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national fiscal policy to act as a significant stabilisation tool. For these reasons, some forms of 
fiscal insurance are desirable. 
Prior to reading the analysis, one should recognise that the forward-looking nature of the 
exercise, which looks at how some of the channels illustrated above will work in the future, 
entails several levels of complexity. Indeed, the CMU project is still in the planning stage, a 
fully-fledged BU does not exist yet and we do not have the hindsight to detect the effect of 
the new system of economic governance. Hence, what we want to measure is in fact 
unobservable, and is surrounded by uncertainty. Overall, this implies that some features of 
the channels can be investigated only in a qualitative fashion and that only a few of their 
properties can be translated into quantitative variables.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that while this contribution refers to both the EU and EMU, the 
literature that looks into ‘regional’ stabilisation mechanisms is usually concerned with 
monetary unions. Indeed, the loss of national monetary policy implies that the economic 
rationale for common fiscal risk sharing mechanism will become stronger. Therefore, the 
analysis will focus on the euro area. However, it must be noted that European governance 
refers more broadly to the EU (with some specific provisions for euro-area countries) while 
the Banking Union is mostly (but not only) important for countries that share the euro, with 
the European Central Bank (ECB) playing a key role. Similarly, developments in the Capital 
Markets Union will be highly intertwined with the single market regulations, which have an 
EU basis.  
Against this background, section 2 focuses on the role of national fiscal policy as a 
countercyclical tool and discusses what one could expect from the new fiscal governance 
framework. Section 3 moves to international adjustment channels and summarises the role of 
labour mobility as shock absorber, based on the most recent literature. Section 4 attempts to 
shed light on the policy debate about the role of international market mechanisms by, first, 
looking into the existing literature, and, second, by proposing a forward-looking analysis. In 
particular, we complement the discussion on the capital and credit markets’ smoothing 
capacity with an empirical exercise seeking to ‘guesstimate’ the capacity of shock absorption 
of EMU in the medium term (by which time the Banking Union should be well in place and 
some progress towards a CMU should have been made). Section 5 discusses whether market 
and fiscal insurance mechanisms are alternative or complementary. The last section draws 
conclusions on the future capacity of the euro area to smooth the impact of shocks and the 
possible benefits, if any, of an EUBS.  
2. EU economic governance and fiscal policy: Will fiscal policy be 
less pro-cyclical? 
2.1 Fiscal policy over the cycle: some stylised facts 
The value added of creating an EUBS directly depends on the income-stabilisation capacity 
of national fiscal policies4. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was primarily designed with 
the idea that (ex-ante) fiscal rules would be able to reduce the risk of negative externalities 
                                                   
4 For a more detailed analysis, see Alcidi, Gros and Thirion (2016) 
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related to excessive deficits and debt accumulation, and would allow to build-up sufficient 
fiscal buffers in order to, in principle, provide fiscal stabilisation ex-post when the economy 
faces an economic slack (the 3% deficit). However, simple empirical evidence on the fiscal 
policy stance over the different phases of the business indicate that the fiscal governance 
framework fell short in terms of counter-cyclical policy outcomes. Figure 1 captures the 
behaviour of the discretionary component of the national fiscal policy stances (measured as 
changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) over the cycle. It provides an account of 
the episodes of pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical fiscal policy stances5 of the member states 
over three sub-periods (pre-EMU, up to the crisis and the crisis), distinguishing between the 
‘good times’ (output gap >0) and ‘bad times’ (output gap <0). It shows that there is a pro-
cyclical bias, with only 20 to 45% of episodes of counter-cyclicality, across the three periods 
under consideration6.  
Instead of counting the cases of pro- and counter-cyclicality across countries, Figure 2 
considers the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area and displays the changes (from the 
previous period) in the structural (cyclically adjusted) and in the discretionary component of 
the fiscal balance. It thus illustrates the overall fiscal impulse and provides a more 
encompassing picture of the stabilisation of fiscal policy over the cycle in the euro area.7 It 
appears that, on aggregate, fiscal policy was generally less pro-cyclical during the pre-crisis 
years than suggested by Figure 1. One explanation for this is that larger countries were more 
counter-cyclical. By contrast, the pro-cyclicality of the discretionary component is strongly 
visible from 2011 onwards, when discretionary policy is contractionary while the output gap 
is still negative and even declining. The figure also shows that such a trend was offset by the 
cyclical component.  
                                                   
5 Pro (counter) – cyclical policy stance is defined as a case where output gap is positive (negative) and 
changes in the primary cyclically adjusted balance are negative (positive). Note that while other 
authors use the changes in output gap rather than levels, we prefer to use levels since this better 
reflects the position in the cycle.  
6 Note that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity. For instance, Germany has exhibited a 
relatively low degree of pro-cyclicality.  
7 Note that there are limits to the stabilising features of fiscal policy activism. Blanchard at al. (2010) 
emphasise the importance of discretionary fiscal actions in mitigating the effects of a severe and 
protracted slump, but suggest that discretionary fiscal measures tend to come too late to fight a 
standard recession, leading only to limited counter-cyclicality during ‘normal times’. 
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Figure 1. Episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy in the EMU (1995-2014) 
 
Figure 2. Fiscal stance decomposition, euro area 
 
Source: Alcidi et al. (2016). 
It seems then that fiscal rules have not worked effectively to create room for countercyclical 
fiscal policy at national level so that it could act as an income stabiliser tool in response to 
asymmetric shocks. One critical shortcoming of the SGP stems from the asymmetry of its 
rules. This problem was compounded by the poor credibility of the no-bail out clause that 
resulted in weak market discipline prior to the sovereign debt crisis.  According to De 
Grauwe (2013), fiscal rules tended to create a deflationary and recessionary bias in the 
eurozone, by becoming binding in times of recession. However, according to empirical 
evidence presented in Alcidi et al. (2016), the picture is more nuanced: risk premia and high 
public debt rather than fiscal rules appear to have affected the policy stance during the 
recession. In broad terms, the level of debt, rules and risk premia, all tend to exert pressure 
for a prudent fiscal stance, but fail to affect the cyclicality of the fiscal policy stance in a 
systematic way. In bad times, high risk-premia induce pro-cyclicality while fiscal rules, 
which become binding because of the level of deficit, eliminate the counter-cyclicality 
observed when governments have fiscal space. In good times, fiscal rules seem to reduce 
pro-cyclicality but there is no evidence that in any way induce counter-cyclical behaviour. 
Overall, fiscal policy exhibits pro-cyclicality but it is difficult to identify how much is to be 
ascribed to fiscal rules or to other factors, like lack of (or excessive) market discipline and 
high debt.   
2.2 Fiscal policy to smooth the cycle: what to expect from the new fiscal 
governance framework 
The crisis unveiled the weaknesses of the existing framework of economic and fiscal 
governance and triggered a number of reforms.8 New rules were added to previous ones and 
                                                   
8 It should be noted that given the general discontent about current fiscal rules, both in term of the 
lack of enforcement and their inability to prevent imbalances, the debate on the re-design of rules is 
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balanced budget rules were enshrined into national law. Coordination and surveillance were 
reinforced, going beyond fiscal policy with the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). 
The MIP’s purpose is to prevent the emergence of excessive imbalances by imposing prudent 
behaviour and encouraging the correction of excessive imbalances at an early stage before 
they lead to large shocks that could spill over into other countries. New rules were also 
introduced for the coordination of national economic policies if a shock occurs.  
If the new framework were to function effectively and member states were not constrained 
in the use of automatic stabilisers, national fiscal policy could play a relevant stabilisation 
role and the value added of a common scheme at European level would be limited. Against 
this background, the rest of this section evaluates the potential benefits and limits that the 
new framework could bring about.  
The enshrinement of fiscal rules in national law (Fiscal Compact) constitutes, at least in 
theory, an important step towards better enforcement and a contribution to reduce the risk of 
future large shocks. However, most countries seem to have forgotten about their existence. 
Moreover, the current approach of the Juncker Commission, which tends to grant a flexible 
interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact9 under certain conditions, while reasonable, 
raises questions on the credibility of full compliance with the rules in the future.  
The legacy of the crisis, in terms of high debt and weak economic conditions, means that we 
may experience a long transition before rules are be strictly enforced. It may be not a 
coincidence that the MIP was never used. 
In the context of EMU, another more subtle element that could complicate the ability of the 
system to implement the rules is the existence of possible trade-offs between fiscal targets 
and the goals of the MIP scoreboard in the short term. The latter greatly depends on the 
competitiveness profile of a country. Improving one country’s competitiveness or avoiding 
the emergence of bubbles, the build-up of debt and other kinds of imbalances (thus assigning 
a positive probability to the respect of MIP indicators) may have short-term costs in terms of 
lower growth, thus making fiscal targets more difficult to meet. Such a trade-off should 
disappear in the long term, but it could continue to be consequential in the current context.  
One of the important novelties of the new framework of governance is that some of the key 
fiscal targets enshrined in national law are defined in structural or cyclically adjusted terms, 
rather than in nominal terms. In theory, structural targets have the advantage that they make 
it easier for national automatic stabilisers to work when needed, and to induce member 
states to build fiscal buffers during upturns. Bova et al. (2014) find partial evidence that some 
features of ‘second-generation’ rules, such as the use of cyclically-adjusted targets (like the 
new set of EU rules) and well-defined escape clauses, together with stronger legal and 
enforcement arrangements, may be associated with less pro-cyclicality. However, structural 
indicators, albeit “smarter” in theory, have a fundamental limit in that structural variables10 
                                                                                                                                                               
likely to continue. This implies that the system of fiscal governance may look different in the medium 
term.    
9 See the European Commission’s Communication, “Making the best use of the flexibility within the 
existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”, Brussels, 13 January 2015 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf).  
10 See Alcidi and Gros (2014). 
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are not observable. They are typically surrounded by a large degree of uncertainty and often 
subject to large revisions. On the one hand, this makes it very difficult for parliaments to 
design domestic budgetary policies to comply with targets that may turn out to be wrong 
few months later. On the other hand, because the potential output is unobservable, policy-
makers might be tempted to interpret temporary revenue gains as permanent, leading to 
higher spending or tax cuts that further fuel booming aggregate demand. Indeed, the IMF 
(2015) argues that while, from a long-term perspective, symmetry in fiscal responses between 
good and bad times is important, in reality it does not occur. Uncertainty around the 
potential output, combined with the fact that a rapidly growing pool of revenues complicates 
efforts to keep a tight lid on total expenditure, tends to result in a pro-cyclical bent. 
For the reasons laid out above, it seems unrealistic to assume that the new fiscal framework 
will be sufficient to address the tendency towards pro-cyclical behaviour, and we cannot rule 
out the possibility that member states will be forced to cut-off fiscal stabilisers when faced 
with large asymmetric shocks. As a result, it is unlikely that fiscal policy will act as a strong 
stabilisation mechanism.  
2.2.1 The ‘soft’ aspect of governance: Learning by doing 
While the current rules-based governance system has proven little success, the soft aspects of 
the new economic governance should not be underestimated. It can be argued that one of the 
essential functions of the European Semester is to create a ‘learning-by-doing loop’, where 
national policy-makers commit to achieving certain targets and learn to think, develop and 
implement their economic policies in a coordinated fashion. Thinking about national 
economic policies as a part of a wider process will become a standardised, natural part of 
domestic policy-making. The creation of a system of financial incentives for coordination and 
structural reforms could accelerate such learning. In line with this way of thinking, one could 
assume that the probability of fulfilling fiscal and economic commitments increases over 
time as the effect of the learning process of coordination. As it becomes more and more 
natural to think of one country’s economic and fiscal policy as a part of a larger coordination 
exercise, the probability of respecting the fiscal and economic targets tends to increase. 
3. Labour mobility as stabilisation mechanism  
As mentioned in the introduction, labour mobility is one channel for smoothing the impact 
of shocks.  According to OCA theory (Mundell, 1961), the mobility of workers constitutes an 
important stabilising mechanism in a monetary union. An increase in unemployment in one 
member state (or a fall in wages) should induce workers to move to other countries; while a 
shortage of labour supply (or higher wages) should attract foreign workers. In principle, 
these flows reduce the cost of regaining full employment through a painful and long process 
of wage adjustment and a long period of unemployment.11 However, the empirical literature 
is far from conclusive as regards the effect of labour mobility in Europe.  
                                                   
11 The ECB's President argued: “Certainly, greater cross-country mobility would be welcome, and we 
should encourage measures that facilitate it. But research suggests that it is unlikely that cross-country 
migration flows will ever become a key driver of labour market adjustment after large shocks. And no 
country will thrive anyway if its population deserts it.” (Draghi, 2014) 
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As argued in Barslund and Busse (2014), labour mobility has responded very little to the 
crisis that started in 2010, taking into account its depth and temporal extent, and with a long 
time-lag, suggesting that this is only a rather marginal tool for achieving the objective of 
income stabilisation. Yet, recent research on the role of regional mobility as a tool for 
equilibrating labour markets in the context of monetary unions, in particular comparing the 
US and the euro area, has emphasised that the role of mobility as a shock absorber somewhat 
increased during the crisis and became more responsive to unemployment differentials. 
According to Beyer and Smets (2015), both in Europe and the US, labour mobility accounts 
for about 50% of the long-run adjustment to region-specific labour demand shocks, but the 
adjustment takes much longer in Europe. Jauer et al. (2014) find that in contrast to the pre-
crisis situation and the findings of previous empirical studies, the mobility response to the 
crisis has been considerable in Europe, as opposed to in the United States, where the crisis 
and subsequent sluggish recovery were not accompanied by greater interregional labour 
mobility. Their estimates suggest that, if all measured population changes in Europe were 
due to migration for employment purposes, up to about a quarter of the asymmetric labour 
market shock would be absorbed by migration within a year. In the eurozone, however, the 
reaction mainly stems from migration of third-country nationals. Even within the group of 
eurozone nationals, a significant part of the free mobility stems from immigrants from third 
countries who have taken on the nationality of their eurozone host country. 
Arpaia et al. (2014) find that euro-area membership (as opposed to EU membership) did not 
significantly increase mobility, but it is associated with a stronger reaction to unemployment 
differentials. In quantitative terms, they find that mobility absorbs about a quarter of a 1% 
shock to labour demand and this rises to 60% after 10 years. This is lower and slower than in 
the US.  
In the context of the analysis of the different mechanisms for smoothing the impact of 
asymmetric shocks (which are usually measured relative to a shock on GDP) it would be 
interesting to compare the role of labour mobility relative to the capacity of other channels. 
This implies understanding the relationship between changes in GDP and labour demand, 
which is broadly measured using ‘Okun’s law’. Such a relationship is difficult to estimate 
and may vary dramatically across countries. Yet, Anderson et al. (2014) estimate the euro 
area’s aggregate Okun coefficient and find a value of -0.31, which suggests that a 1% fall in 
GDP growth is associated with a contemporaneous 0.31 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate. Under this assumption, the estimates of Arpaia et al. (2014) and Jauer et 
al. (2014) suggest that about one-fourth of labour demand shock is absorbed by mobility, 
which would mean that labour mobility in the euro area absorbs around 0.08% (1/4 of 0.031) 
of a 1% shock to GDP. This suggests that the role of mobility is limited but, as will be shown 
later, the magnitude of its importance may be comparable to that of other channels.12 
4. Integration of credit and capital markets  
In a monetary union, cross-country risk sharing and consumption smoothing are particularly 
relevant because monetary policy can no longer respond to country-specific shocks, and the 
                                                   
12 It should be noted that this is a matter where data availability is still a real issue. The mobility levels 
of EU, EA and third-country nationals are difficult to distinguish and to capture. In several studies, 
regional mobility also includes mobility within countries, which may not be relevant to an EUBS. 
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exchange rate is no longer floating. The empirical literature addressing the measurement of 
the channels that smooth the effect of shocks across countries in the face of asymmetric 
shocks has distinguished between the private market channels (international credit and 
capital markets) and government (tax and transfers from the centre). Under the assumption 
that markets are complete, capital markets provide full insurance against asymmetric shocks, 
and is no justification for interregional fiscal transfers (Eichengreen, 1991). This is why it is 
important to gauge how far financial integration can go in terms of risk-sharing benefits. 
The debate on how to make the E(M)U sustainable in the long run is often divided between 
those who believe that the market should be the main shock absorber, and the camp that 
argues that fiscal risk sharing arrangements are warranted regardless. In practice, the 
(political and) economic case for an EUBS also crucially depends on how this question is 
settled.  
Given recent efforts to foster financial market integration, an analysis should not only look at 
the past, but also include an assessment of the degree of market risk sharing that can be 
achieved in the future. This implies asking what role the BU and the CMU can play to endow 
the Union with a capacity to insure itself against asymmetric shocks, and to reduce their 
occurrence. Working from this perspective, this section will first provide a review of the 
empirical literature on the channels of international risk sharing in existing federations and 
in Europe, paying particular attention to the role of financial integration. We then proceed to 
a forward-looking discussion on the effects that the BU and potential CMU could play in 
reducing the probability of shocks, and in improving private risk sharing. Finally, we carry 
out an empirical exercise that consists in comparing the level of risk sharing achieved by the 
core countries, which remained financially integrated during the crisis, as opposed the non-
core. To the extent that the BU and potential CMU will make core and non-core countries 
more closely integrated, this exercise should provide us with a ‘guesstimation’ of the future 
euro area risk-sharing capacity.  
4.1 The role of markets and government in smoothing consumption and 
income: a literature review 
The political and academic debate about which channels should be used to smooth the 
impact of shocks often fails to distinguish risk sharing and consumption smoothing and 
generally refers to ‘international risk sharing’. However, the distinction between the two 
concepts is crucial. Risk sharing is a concept that relates to the idea of risk diversification 
and is linked to the existence of different ‘states of nature’, some good and others bad, that 
could materialise and the fact that people want to protect themselves against the risk that 
bad states adversely affect their well-being. In broad terms, (market) risk sharing requires 
access to international capital markets and occurs either through having a diversified 
portfolio of international assets or an explicit insurance policy, hence it is based on ex-ante 
arrangements that kick in automatically to smooth domestic income in the event of a shock. 
Consumption smoothing posits a consumption choice on different dates, it is an inter-
temporal concept according to which individuals (or countries) can maintain a steady level 
of consumption over time in the face of temporary shocks that may result in fluctuations in 
income, which in turn can translate into fluctuations in consumption. The buffering of 
consumption against income shocks usually occurs through savings and borrowings in 
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international credit markets whereas consumption smoothing is a form of intertemporal 
risk sharing, albeit cross-country, and it occurs ex-post. Asdrubali et al. (1996) provide an 
integrated framework to quantify relative inter-state risk sharing for various channels for 
smoothing shocks. The key channels identified are measured as follows: 
 International capital markets (private risk sharing via cross-ownership of assets or 
income smoothing). This channel relates to international portfolio diversification. The 
effect of a drop in output in a country on its residents’ income directly depends on how 
much of the country’s productive assets (in particular capital) are owned by residents of 
other regions and how much of foreign productive assets are held by nationals. For 
instance, if financial intermediaries lend to foreign borrowers, the flow of interest 
payments from abroad provides a cushion in the lending country.  
 International credit markets (or consumption smoothing or ‘inter-temporal’ risk-
sharing). Saving and borrowing allow the smoothing of consumption over time through 
the business cycle, as households and firms, as well as national governments can 
accumulate assets, save or borrow using the credit market (mostly banks). This is an ex-
post mechanism 
 Government redistribution (fiscal risk sharing). Federal tax, transfers and grants are 
used in federations to absorb the negative effects of asymmetric shocks 
This classification is the usual starting point for measuring the role of the different channels. 
4.1.1 The EMU vs. fully-fledged federations  
The early empirical literature on risk sharing started in the 1990s and mainly focused on 
inter-state risk sharing between the US States. Research has focused on the risk sharing 
provided through federal fiscal transfers. For instance, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991) 
consider nine US States for the period 1970-1980 and find that net transfers (risk sharing and 
distribution) made by the federal government absorbed one-third and one-half of the shock. 
This approach was refined by Bayoumi and Masson (1995) who disentangle the risk sharing 
component of federal taxes and transfers from their permanent redistribution effects. They 
find that in the US, the risk-sharing effect of net transfers amounts to around 30%. In 
Canada, risk sharing through net federal transfers is smaller (17%). More recently, 
Poghosyan et al. (2014) focus on the role of net fiscal transfers only in Australia, Canada and 
the US. Their main finding is that fiscal transfers at the central level have little effect in terms 
of risk sharing. In particular, the impact of net fiscal transfers on risk sharing as a response to 
asymmetric shocks ranges between 4% and 11%, while a larger impact (between 13% and 
24%) is found for inter-temporal stabilisation, i.e. in response to common shocks and a 
simultaneous fall in output across regions.  
In their path-breaking paper, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that 62% of a shock to a state’s GDP 
is cushioned through the combined role of capital markets (39%) and international credit 
markets (23%), while federal tax and transfers account for a further 13% (and 25% remains 
unsmotthed). Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) find that around 70% of the shocks in 
the United States are smoothed through private and public risk-sharing mechanisms. Again, 
financial markets play the biggest role, allowing around 60% of the total smoothing, while 
federal fiscal policy covers the other 10%. For Germany, Hepp and von Hagen (2013) find, in 
the pre-unification period, that the federal tax transfer provided most of the smoothing and 
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grant system (55%), while for the post-unification period, international factor income flows 
have become the most important channel, contributing about 51% of total income smoothing.  
European Monetary Union triggered new interest in international risk sharing. Clearly, 
Europe was, and to some extent still is, fundamentally different from these federal states 
since it lacks a central government with a federal budget, and exhibits a weaker quality and 
degree of financial integration. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) find that only 40% of asymmetric 
shocks to output is smoothed among OECD countries, with 50% of the smoothing occurring 
via government saving and 50% via private saving. The role of the international capital 
market is found to be non-existent prior to 1999. A more recent study by Furceri and 
Zdzienicka (2013) considers a panel of euro-area countries over the period 1979-2010 and 
finds that the euro area stills lacks the degree of risk sharing observed in existing federations. 
According to their estimates, the share of unsmoothed cross-country shocks in the euro area 
(EA) is about 60%, much higher than in other federations like US, Canada or Germany where 
according to past studies (see Asdrubali et al. 1996; and Hepp and Van von Hagen, 2013) it 
amounts to about 20%.  
4.1.2 Financial integration and risk sharing in the EMU 
In the context of a discussion on the new EMU governance architecture, it is crucial to look 
more closely at the role that financial integration has played and can play in the future in 
fostering market risk-sharing (i.e. via capital and credit markets). Indeed, from theoretical 
point of view (see Mundell, 1973), financial integration can provide important benefits, as it 
creates opportunities for adapting to shocks by increasing risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing.  
However, when looking at the experience of the euro area, empirical accounts call for some 
more nuance in drawing conclusions. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) show that the channels for 
risk sharing evolved after the creation of EMU. In particular, they find that risk sharing 
through factor income flows and capital gains was close to zero prior to the introduction of 
euro in 1999, but it has then increased to 6% for each channels. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008) 
and Demyank et al. (2007) find that increased holdings of foreign assets and banking 
integration in the EMU have spurred risk sharing, ‘improving ex-post the optimality of the 
EMU’. However, capital markets remain largely untapped in Europe, if one considers that in 
the US inter-state risk sharing through factor income reaches 40%. Moreover, Kalemli-Ozcan 
et al. (2013) find that during the crisis, international factor income did not provide any risk 
sharing; on the contrary, it may have acted as a shock amplifier. As Allard et al. (2014) point 
it out, the general explanation for the subdued international risk sharing in the euro area is 
that the cross-border ownership of assets remains very limited within the union, which 
reduces the capital markets’ insurance. Moreover, Demyank et al. (2007) stress that asset 
holdings outside the EMU tend to have the largest risk-sharing properties, as their return is 
more likely to be uncorrelated with the euro area cycle. The latter observation has important 
implications when it comes to assessing the future impact of a capital markets union and 
more generally of further integration: convergence in business cycles and correlation in asset 
returns could also potentially reduce the scope for risk sharing. 
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) find that the bulk of risk sharing continued to come mainly 
from the credit channel, through borrowing and savings, since the EMU’s creation. Yet, it is 
unclear whether the higher degree of integration in the interbank market has produced 
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positive effects in terms of shock absorption capacity. Estimates by Demyank et al. (2007) 
point to a decrease in the overall international credit smoothing in the five years following 
the EMU, compared to the five previous years. While there appears to be some variability in 
the estimated role of the credit channel, the overall trend seems to point to a small decline 
over 1999-2007. As for the role of public versus private saving, the main finding is that public 
saving consumption smoothing remained fairly steady after the EMU introduction, while 
private credit’ role has tended to decline. According to Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013), the 
reduction of private credit as a smoothing factor after the introduction of the euro reflects the 
fact that credit flows have become less counter-cyclical, even though amounts have 
increased.  
One crucial characteristic of the credit channel is that it tends to be ineffective during crises. 
Hoffman and Nitschka (2012) argue that the effectiveness of risk sharing channels during 
prolonged crises tends to differ from periods of normal business-cycle fluctuations. Furceri 
and Zdzienicka (2013) examine how different types of crises affect risk sharing over the 
period 1980-2010 and find that risk-sharing via the international credit markets tends to be 
lowest when it is most needed because (interbank) credit markets have a high propensity to 
freeze up during crises. Overall, this feature of the credit channel suggests that large shocks 
can strongly impair consumption smoothing by constraining private and public sector’s 
capacity to borrow. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014) find that international consumption 
smoothing has remained stable during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 as the stimulus 
produced by governments, compensated for the fall in that from private channels. By 
contrast, the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 led to a collapse of the role of 
governments in responding to shocks. In particular, countries that had run prolonged 
expansionary policies in the booming years, or had experienced bubbles, were forced to save 
when the crisis erupted.  
Overall, the literature seems to suggest that, in Europe, the capacity to respond to shocks 
remains weak, as compared to federations, and it is vulnerable during crises. Although there 
is no doubt that the EMU boosted financial integration, little private risk sharing has taken 
place. Indeed, large parts of country-specific shocks remain unsmoothed, as the role of the 
market is relatively small and mainly driven by credit markets, rather than by capital 
markets, whose functioning tends to be more stable over the cycle. This implies that while 
the system is endowed with a certain capacity to smooth consumption, it seems unable to 
ensure sufficient risk sharing during period of important stress. A possible explanation for it 
is that financial debt instruments, particularly the wholesale funding of banks, rather than 
cross-country ownership of equity, dominated financial integration in Europe. This has 
important implications, since capital markets are less subject to reversal (See Box 1) and can 
absorb loss associated with permanent shocks, whereas intertemporal consumption 
smoothing can only address temporary shocks (Bolton et al., 2013 and Valiante, 2016). 
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Figure 4. Share of MFI cross-border holdings of debt securities 
issued by EU corporates and sovereigns, 2005-14) (%) 
Source: Valiante (2016), based on ECB data 
Box 1. Financial market (dis)integration during the crisis: equity and debt 
Between the creation of the EMU and the beginning of the financial crisis, financial integration, 
broadly defined as increasing cross-border claims and falling dispersion across market prices, 
grew to three times its original level at the end of 1998, both in terms of price-convergence and 
even more in relative terms for quantity indicators (see Figure 3). Nonetheless, the hit taken 
during the financial crisis of 2008-
09 took a heavy toll on the 
financial integration process, 
reversing the degree of integration 
(both in the core and at the 
periphery). Price-based indicators 
dropped across the board due to a 
great divergence of prices and 
yields, and volumes were affected 
with the deepening of the 
sovereign debt crisis and the 
subsequent segmentation in the 
interbank market starting in 2011. 
Indicators of financial integration 
have started to recover since, both 
in terms of quantities and prices. 
After 2009, the cross-country dispersion of both the cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations 
and of interest rates on deposits increased substantially and has only narrowed down in recent 
times. In particular, the gap between the average financing cost in the core and non-core countries 
dramatically increased over the 2008-09 period, and has only started to narrow since 2015. Beyond 
the divergence between the core and non-core countries in terms of development of their banks and 
funding structures, indicators of integration in the debt securities market also point to financial 
fragmentation. Similarly, the dispersion of sovereign bond yields sharply increased at the height of 
the EMU crisis, with severe consequences, as we know. Following the introduction of the OMT, the 
dispersion came back to levels close to what was observed prior to the sovereign debt crisis, but 
holdings are much lower.  
Figure 4 shows that cross-border 
holdings of debt securities by 
monetary and financial 
institutions (MFIs) fell drastically 
during the crisis in the euro area. 
This was one of the main 
manifestations of the financial 
fragmentation that exacerbated 
the economic crisis in peripheral 
euro-area countries, showing that 
larger cross-border financial flows 
and large stocks of debt can create 
instability (Mink and de Haan, 
2014). Indeed, euro area member 
countries’ financial systems are 
heavily bank-centred, while stock 
and bond markets provide a 
relatively modest share of the 
Figure 3. Price- and quantity-based SYNFINT* in the euro 
area 
 
* SYNFIT is a synthetic indicator developed by the ECB. Source: ECB.  
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Figure 5. Cross-border holdings of equity issued by euro-area 
residents (% of total holdings) 
Note: Non-distressed countries are Germany, the Netherlands, 
France, Austria and Finland. Distressed countries are Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland.  
Source: Valiante (2016), based on ECB data. 
4.2 What to expect from Banking Union and Capital Markets Union 
As previously discussed, the political and economic case for an EUBS crucially depends on 
the degree of market risk sharing that can be achieved in the future. A relevant question is 
thus to ask what role the BU and the potential CMU can play to endow the Union with a 
capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks. Against this backdrop, this section discusses the 
expected effects of the BU and CMU. We break down the analysis of the effect of the BU into 
an ex-ante perspective (risk reduction) and an ex-post perspective (absorbing the impact of 
shocks).13 We then proceed to a hypothetical discussion of what would have happened in 
Spain and Ireland had a banking union been in place at the time. Finally, we discuss the 
potential impact that a CMU could have on risk sharing. 
4.2.1 Banking Union: An ex-ante perspective 
The remarkable steps achieved towards the creation of a European Banking Union are 
arguably the most significant economic policy change since the introduction of the euro. The 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is the first pillar of the BU, started its 
supervisory role in 2014. It is expected improve the detection of financial risks, reduce the 
propagation of shocks and to some extent boost financial integration. A more-encompassing 
monitoring could thus reduce the frequency of large financial shocks and could affect their 
nature (transitory versus permanent) and transmission to the real economy.  
                                                   
13 Longer-term effects of further financial integration, like the possible impact of very high capital 
market integration on the bargaining power of labour, go beyond the scope of this analysis and are 
not addressed. 
financing to the private sector. In fact, total bank assets account for 283% of GDP in the EU, 
compared to about 65% of GDP in the US (Fuceri and Zdzienicka, 2013). 
Figure 5 shows that cross-border 
holdings of equity as a share of 
total equity holdings did not fall. 
Holdings of equity across the 
euro area have doubled since the 
introduction of the euro, both in 
distressed and non-distressed 
countries and, importantly, it has 
exhibited strong resilience to the 
financial and sovereign crises. 
Nonetheless, as already pointed 
out total equity holdings are still 
limited compared to other 
financial instruments, especially 
debt securities. For euro area 
MFIs, cross-border holdings of 
equity amount to about 25% of 
cross-border debt security 
holdings (based on ECB data). 
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The BU’s functions that relate to the centralisation of monitoring and assessment of risk in 
the banking sector are supposed to be an important tool for risk reduction. By providing 
centralised supervision of the banking sector, the SSM should offer a European-wide view of 
emerging risks in the banking sector. By the same token, it should help overcome problems 
of coordination among national supervisors, which contributed to the financial 
fragmentation at the peak of the crisis in the euro area. As an independent supervisor, the 
ECB is better positioned to pursue long-term stability objectives, in contrast to more political 
short-term goals, which have affected the behaviour of some national supervisory authorities 
in the past.  
Whereas there are clear potential benefits to adopting a common supervisory framework, it 
must also be highlighted that not all European banks fall under the new framework of 
supervision and the BU may not imply a big change for them, at least in terms of early 
detection of risks. In particular, small banks remain under the national supervisor authority. 
They will have to follow guidelines imposed by Frankfurt if the national regulator does not 
abide by the single regulatory framework, but will not be subject to the direct supervision of 
the SSM. Despite their individual size, small banks, which account for about 15% of EMU 
banking assets (ECB, 2013), can pose a systemic risk. The experience of Spain proved that this 
is not trivial - small banks can lead to a large crisis.  
Looking ahead, the risks associated with small banks, which may look rather irrelevant 
when considered in isolation, could be more an issue in Germany than in Spain. Indeed, in 
Spain many small banks disappeared as a consequence of acquisitions and mergers (e.g. 
Bankia) and now fall under the SSM. By contrast, in Germany, there are large networks of 
very small banks, which would escape any changes introduced by the Banking Union, and in 
an adverse scenario, their tight linkages could lead to a large risk. In principle, one of the 
tasks of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is to detect such risks.  
Besides the reduction of risk, the BU is also likely to affect equity market dynamics by 
favouring cross-border banking integration, even though this is likely to be limited in the 
initial phase. Many banks in Europe that have a cross-border dimension (i.e. they operate in 
more than one member state) have often encountered difficulties because of the different 
behaviours of the different national supervisory authorities. National supervisors have had a 
natural tendency to protect the national champions, limiting de facto cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions and the formation of multinational banks, despite their commitment to the 
EU single market. Since prudential supervision has been transferred to the ECB, these 
barriers no longer exist. The SSM will guarantee the uniformity in the application of the 
supervision rules and cross-border banks will have a single point of contact. Cross-border 
equity investments in the banking sector are hence expected to become more frequent. This 
could work as a stabilising factor during a crisis, as the experience of the Baltic countries has 
shown.14  
Similarly, if the BU is successful at limiting the intervention of governments in the countries 
where the banks are based and at reducing the costs of bank resolution then investors should 
be better able to compare banks on their own merits rather than according to the judgement 
of their home country.  
                                                   
14 See Gros and Alcidi (2015).  
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4.2.2 Banking Union: An ex-post perspective 
From an ex-post perspective, i.e. relating to the absorption of (financial) shocks, the second 
pillar of the BU – namely the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), with a centralised 
resolution approach and common financial resources (the Single Resolution Fund, or SRF) – 
is of critical importance.  
The crisis revealed the difficulty of operating efficiently without common monitoring and 
resolution procedures in an increasingly integrated banking sector. As argued by Buch et al. 
(2015) a bank-based financial system within a monetary union may lead to limited effective 
private risk sharing across countries, because national supervisors and policy-makers have 
an incentive to protect their banking system. In particular, they tend to present banking 
issues as being of a liquidity nature, which often implicitly results in shifting the 
responsibility for managing the risks to the central bank via its refinancing operations.  
In this respect, the common supervision and resolution framework provided by the SSM and 
SRM, should help significantly to reduce the risk of collective action failures observed during 
the crisis (Veron, 2014) and should lead to more private risk sharing as the new framework 
involves a bail-in prior to considering any form of bail-out. Ideally, the common resources 
should then allow cutting the doom-loop between banks and their sovereigns as resolution is 
moved to a central level.15 
In cases where severe problem emerge, risk sharing should occur through bail-in, which 
would distribute losses among all creditors and not only among capital holders. This should 
increase the loss-absorption capacity of banks without recourse to common money.16 In fact, 
in the current system, the bail-in of creditors is a necessary condition for the intervention of 
the SRF. If creditors are geographically diversified, bail-in is a tool for sharing losses across 
borders. This also implies that, since depositors (especially small savers) tend to be domestic, 
it is essential to safeguard their interests in order to limit the negative impact of the bail-in on 
the domestic economy. Indeed, if creditors that are to participate in the bail-in are 
preponderantly residents, local households or other local financial intermediaries, the bail-in 
can severely harm the domestic economy and aggravate the crisis, leading to contagion 
throughout the domestic economy. In this case, while public finances are not directly 
affected, indirect negative effects (erosion of pensions and other savings) may hit the 
economy, which, in turn, can result in adverse fiscal effects. Under these conditions, the BU 
cannot help much in terms of loss sharing.  
                                                   
15 The strong interdependence that exists between banks and their sovereign states led to the so-called 
doom loop between sovereigns and their banks. This is the result of the fact that European banks 
remain heavily exposed to their sovereign due to home bias in terms of domestic bond holdings, and 
of guarantees – even of an implicit nature – of national governments in favour of domestic banks. This 
created a strong link between the dynamics of sovereign states’ bonds and the cost of funding for 
banks in capital markets (see IMF, 2012).  
16 In the new framework, before the SRF is used, shareholders and creditors must bear losses of at least 
8% of liabilities (based on historical losses). Then the SRF can contribute up to 5% of the bank 
liabilities. Under such a system, the bail-in of creditors is most likely and larger when banks have low 
capital relative to total liabilities. It also implies that some banks may be excluded from the SRF 
recapitalisation because they do not meet the requirements for bail-in.  
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In this respect, the specific design of the bail-in clauses will matter in a crucial way in 
defining how much risk sharing they can contribute to.17 Some uncertainty is likely to 
remain, if for instance, bail-in implies some conversion of debt into capital. In that case, it is 
impossible to establish ex-ante how much risk and losses are shared.  
Despite the remarkable steps already taken, the BU is still incomplete: it lacks a fiscal 
backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a common deposit insurance scheme. The 
delay in the process and the limited size of the SRF (€55 billion18) reflect, on the one hand, the 
reluctance of EMU leaders to pool fiscal resources and, on the other hand, the challenges 
faced by to recovering from the crisis.  
Gros and Belke (2014) note that the SRF is sufficient to deal with individual bank failures or 
even a domestic systemic crisis in small to medium-sized countries. De Groen and Gros 
(2015) show that, during the period 2007-14, in the euro area, 72 banks received capital 
support in the form of state aids. The banks aided (representing approximately 45% of the 
total euro-area bank assets) experienced total losses of more than €300 billion. Of those 72 
banks, more than 30 might have received support under the new mechanism (the SRF and 
the bank recovery and resolution Directive, BRRD), had it been in place.19 
By contrast, Schoenmaker (2014) emphasises that without a common fiscal backstop to the 
SRF, the transmission from bank to sovereign will not be cut in the case of large crisis. In 
other words, the banking union, in its current state, would not be able to handle a systemic 
crisis. Indeed, losses of failing banks can be very large and both bail-in and the SRF 
interventions may turn out to be insufficient20 to cover all losses21 and prevent the burden to 
fall on possibly weakened sovereigns. In this respect, a common deposit guarantee scheme 
or a reinsurance scheme for national deposit insurance schemes (Gros, 2013) could be of 
crucial importance for the stability of the financial system and its resilience to systemic 
events 22(see Gros, 2015). In the absence of this element, it would be illusory to expect the BU 
to have the same effects as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which features 
both a common resolution system, and common deposit insurance backed by the US 
government. While there is no explicit backstop, one can argue that the ESM is already a sort 
                                                   
17 A bail-in of creditors is a mechanism either to cancel/reduce liabilities of failing banks or to restore a 
bank’s capital position by converting its debt into equity; this can follow different modalities. 
18 From 2016 onwards, the SRF will collect the funds for the recapitalisation of euro-area banks. The 
fund has a target level of 1% of covered deposits, which the European Commission estimated to equal 
about €55 billion. Euro-area banks will have to pay a risk-adjusted annual premium (on average 
12.5%) of the target level. In the period 2016-23, the fund will raise approximately €6.9 billion per 
annum. If ex-ante contributions were to be complemented with ex-post contributions, the maximum 
firepower of the fund could be increased by €20.6 billion to €75.6 billion. See De Groen and Gros 
(2015) for more details on the estimates of the bridging needs and the SRF.  
19 See De Groen and Gros (2015) for a detailed analysis. 
20 See De Groen and Gros (2015). 
21 See Gros (2014b). 
22 This gives rise to complex political economy implications as this presupposes the creation of a 
common pool of resources and would eventually involve some degree of fiscal risk sharing. As 
reflected in the current debate between the Northern and Southern member states, going forward in 
that direction is likely to require reducing the exposure of sovereigns to their own bank. 
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of implicit fiscal backstop, and could serve in the direct recapitalisation of banks if a 
sovereign state is not able to fund itself.  
Finally, from a broader point of view, breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and reducing the 
differences in supervisory activities are also key steps for monetary policy as they should 
help repair the transmission mechanisms of ECB monetary policies. During the crisis, 
financial fragmentation was driven by the sovereign–bank doom loop, and low interest rates 
were not transmitted to those member states hit the hardest by the crisis, thereby cancelling 
out the ECB’s actions to stimulate those economies.  
4.2.3 Banking Union and the housing bubbles in Ireland and Spain 
To illustrate the importance of BU in the case of financial asymmetric shocks, one can 
conduct the thought experiment of how the boom-bust cycles in Ireland and Spain would 
have played out, if the SRM had been fully operational (i.e. after the end of the transition 
period).  
From the ex-ante point of view, it makes little sense to assume that the SSM would 
necessarily have detected the presence of a housing bubble. However, it is reasonable to 
believe that the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) would have been much 
more likely than a local supervisor to warn banks about excessive real-estate valuations, thus 
imposing limits on over-lending. Admittedly, dealing with a bubble is always very difficult. 
The experience of advanced economies from Japan to the US, but also China more recently, 
shows the great difficulty in detecting bubbles ex-ante and even more so, taking the political 
decision to intervene to stop them in a booming economy. This suggests that while 
prudential macro policies are certainly useful and important, the assumption that boom-bust 
shocks will no longer happen is not realistic. The more realistic expectation is that the 
presence of the SSM should reduce the likelihood that busts pose a risk of triggering a 
sovereign default. 
When the real estate bubble turns into a bust and the local banks get into big difficulty, as 
occurred in Ireland, the ECB would be expected to flag the banks in difficulty to the SRF, 
which would then decide whether to allow them to fail and put them into resolution or 
whether to save them because of their systemic nature. The funds needed to save any bank 
(or enable an orderly resolution) would have come from the SRF first, instead of coming 
entirely from the national government, as was the case in 2011. Thus, the SRF should have 
prevented the feedback loop between bank and sovereign. 
Importantly, the potential financial intervention of the SRF would have probably been lower 
in cost than the losses incurred by the Irish government because the bail-in rules, under the 
BRRD, mandate that public funds can be provided only if shareholders but also (some) 
creditors have accepted a loss. This did not happen in Ireland. At that time, the entire euro-
area banking system was in difficulty and it was thought that letting any Irish banks fail 
would have sparked another panic, comparable to the one that followed the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008 (Gros and Belke, 2014). 
The Irish government would have had to participate ‘automatically’ only in the costs 
associated with banks where losses were so large that the national deposit insurance scheme 
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had to intervene to guarantee that no insured depositor made a loss.23 The case stresses again 
the need for soundly capitalised banks and credible deposit insurance schemes. 
The experience of the boom and bust in Spain was different from that in Ireland, owing to 
the structure of its banking sector, but also because there was a certain consensus at EU level 
that the Irish scenario had to be avoided. One of the key features of the Spanish banking 
sector before the crisis was its strong market segmentation. The industry was characterised, 
on the one hand, by a few very large, internationally diversified banks, which remained 
almost unaffected by the crisis and, on the other hand, by many small, local banks (cajas). 
This large number of (regional, semi-public) savings banks had lent heavily to property 
developers and the bursting of the bubble essentially bankrupted them. Given the large 
number of banks involved, the losses were widely dispersed across the industry and 
nationalisation was not considered a reasonable option. In Ireland, where losses were highly 
concentrated in two financial institutions, nationalisation was the immediate solution. In 
Spain, several small banks were merged (to create Bankia), and Spain was offered a credit 
line (up to €100 billion) to proceed to a thorough restructuring of the banking sector. If the 
current framework had been in place, existing funds in banks, the bail-in of creditors and the 
SRF24 would have absorbed three-quarters of the estimated losses, implying a much smaller 
intervention on the part of the Spanish government.  
Overall, the experiments suggest that, on the one hand, the BU framework should prevent 
banks from taking excessive risks and force private risk sharing through contributions from 
the banking industry to the SRF. On the other hand, it should also protect, at least partially, 
sovereigns from domestic bank failures, by transferring part of the risk to debt- and capital 
holders.  
The degree of risk sharing that ultimately develops will depend not only on the effect that 
the BU has on financial integration but also on the effect of the CMU. 
4.2.4 Capital Markets Union25 
The aim of the CMU project26 is to bolster integration in capital markets and to move 
towards a more market-based financial system. If successfully achieved, this could have a 
substantial impact on the risk-sharing capacity of the monetary union. As argued above, 
there is no doubt that EMU has bolstered financial integration in the euro area, but this 
happened only in certain market segments. Financial integration relied heavily on interbank 
credit markets (Fecht et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2008) and when the crisis erupted, the euro area 
                                                   
23 See De Groen and Gros (2015) for a simulation exercise of the probable distribution of losses by six 
Irish banks, if the new system of resolution (and the €55 billion of the SRF) had been in place. The 
paper shows that about half of the losses (more than €60 billion) would have been covered by the 
banks’ own funds, the bail-in and the SRF.  
24 De Groen and Gros (2015) show that for the 13 Spanish banks considered for the simulation exercise, 
the SRF alone would have contributed about €30 billion of the €70 billion in estimated losses. 
25 See Valiante (2016) for an extensive analysis of the Capital Markets Union, also including its 
potential impact on risk sharing.  
26 On 30 September 2015, the Commission launched the Capital Markets Union Action Plan to build a 
true single market for capital (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5731_en.htm). While 
the Action Plan has prompted substantial debate, the transition towards a complete Capital Markets 
Union is likely to take several years.   
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was still far from being a true single financial market. In fact, it still is far from it. The crisis 
has shown that credit flows can abruptly stop and even reverse, especially if claims are 
unequally distributed and inflows are concentrated, as was the case in peripheral member 
states of the euro area until 2010. The sudden stop to lending experienced by several 
countries, from the Baltic States to Greece, provides ample evidence of this phenomenon.  
Overall, the experience of the crisis suggests that the dominant role of banks and debt may 
be a source of vulnerability. According to Fuceri and Zdzienicka (2013) the lack of capital 
market integration and the bias towards banks are precisely the factors hindering further risk 
sharing in the euro area.  
In contrast to debt instruments, equity flows, either in the form of investment portfolios or 
(even more so) in the case of foreign direct investment, tend to be more stable and less likely 
to be quickly reversed in the event of a crisis because they are more costly to liquidate. FDI 
flows are indeed more sensitive to information specifically related to a certain project or 
country than to the global market sentiment.  
As discussed above, the issue of cross-country capital/equity ownership is relevant for risk-
sharing purposes in the case of banks, but more broadly in the case of companies. In fact 
‘true’ market risk sharing in the case of asymmetric shocks can only be increased if the 
ownership of capital is geographically diversified. This is one of the purposes of the CMU. 
The CMU is still in the proposal stage and it is difficult to predict its progress in the medium 
term. Yet two observations can be made at this point. On the one hand, given the low 
starting level of capital market insurance, there is a lot of room for improvement. On the 
other hand, given the very high number of small- and medium-sized enterprises and family-
run companies, where the participation of foreigners in providing capital is either impossible 
or very difficult, US levels are unlikely to be a realistic benchmark against which to evaluate 
EMU any time soon. 
It is worth mentioning that while financial integration can be beneficial from several points 
of view, it carries risks. When financial integration occurs, policies and the regulatory 
framework should ensure the elimination of barriers to the circulation of capital in order to 
have a fully-fledged cross-border market but also to avoid excessive concentration of 
holdings in some parts of the system and excessive leverage. Market mechanisms alone are 
usually insufficient to manage risk, especially when the level of integration is very high. 
Indeed, markets and financial institutions can be subject to self-fulfilling prophecies (Allen 
and Gale, 1998) accelerated by fast movements of capital, which may quickly affect liquidity 
conditions both of banks and financial markets. This can lead to more easily spread 
contagion in the event that a large financial crisis erupts. If the shock is large and not quickly 
absorbed by the system, there is a risk that it will become systemic and the adjustment costs 
for the real economy will become very large. 
Large cross-border claims can mitigate the local impact of financial shocks (as happened 
through the presence of foreign banks in the Baltic States), but they can also propagate 
shocks to the overall financial system. A strong presence of foreign banks can transmit 
financial shocks abroad to the domestic economy if the foreign banks operating are not 
sufficiently resilient or if they just cut their exposure.  
An example of the mitigation of financial shocks occurred at the beginning of the global 
financial crisis when some large banks from some euro-area member states started to pull 
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back capital and credit lines from their subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. These 
banks were mostly based in countries with relatively weak fiscal and balance-of-payment 
positions or were very large relative to the size of their home country, such as Italy, Austria 
and Belgium (Gros and Belke, 2014). The ‘Vienna initiative’ in 2009, stopped the action. The 
key stakeholders agreed to prevent a large-scale and uncoordinated withdrawal from the 
region and committed to maintaining their exposure as well as to recapitalising their 
subsidiaries. The opposite could have triggered a systemic bank crisis. 
An example of the propagation of the shock through cross-border bank exposure occurred 
on a large scale after 2010. Banks from core, euro area countries started to cut their exposure 
vis-à-vis sovereigns and other banks located in the periphery. Since the cross-border 
exposure did not entail capital (unlike for those banks involved in the Vienna imitative) the 
decision to cut was easy and fast. Moreover, unlike for the Vienna initiative, there was no 
coordinated action to avert the liquidity crisis. 
Another risk associated with high financial integration relates to production specialisation.27 
As movements of capital become easier, production tends to specialise according to 
comparative advantage.28 In the case of banks,29 this can result in higher systemic risks. In the 
case of manufacturing and other industries, it could result in a situation where different 
regions of the Union are prone and, in principle, vulnerable to different output shocks, hence 
increasing the likelihood of asymmetric shocks for which price and wage adjustment are 
inevitable. 
4.3 ‘Guesstimating’ future shock-smoothing properties of EMU: An exercise 
based on the experience of core EMU countries  
Assuming that the BU and the CMU will provide the euro-area capital markets with a 
capacity to absorb losses that is comparable to that in the US does not seem appropriate. As 
mentioned earlier, estimates suggest that about 40% of a GDP shock in the US is absorbed by 
international factor income, while the same is currently negligible in the EMU. The US is an 
interesting benchmark but given its large experience as a monetary and banking union and 
federal state, it is unrealistic to assume that any plausible change in the EMU could lead to 
similar features. At best, the US capacity is an upper-bound benchmark. This is especially the 
case once the idea that market-based insurance mechanisms do not operate independently of 
fiscal risk sharing (non-existent in the EMU but functioning in the US) is taken into 
consideration. 
This section complements our analysis with an empirical exercise that could be thought of as 
a ‘guesstimation’ of the degree of risk-sharing that could be achieved in the euro area if the 
BU and CMU led the whole region to reach a similar degree of integration to that of the core 
countries. We start from the observation that the crisis played out differently in core 
northern euro-area countries and in the euro-area periphery: core countries remained 
financially integrated during the crisis, while financial markets in the periphery became 
                                                   
27 See Krugman (1991) and the core-periphery patterns theory and OECD (1999) chapter 4. 
28 If higher mobility of capital lead to increasing return on capital, this will tend to depress the labour 
share of income and hence in the long term the bargaining power of labour. 
29 See Fecth et al. (2012).  
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again national as fragmentation ensued. Core countries are defined as Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, France, Finland and Austria. We define the non-core as Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, and Spain.  
The hypothesis we want to test is whether the fact that core countries have been highly 
integrated for a long time, both from an economic30 and financial31 point of view, improved 
their capacity to smooth the impact of shocks relative to the peripheral countries. In 
particular, the fact that both credit and equity markets remained integrated even at the peak 
of the crisis could be seen as the outcome one might expect in the presence of the BU32 and 
the CMU. If this is the case, the degree of market risk sharing that occurred in the core 
countries during the crisis should provide us with an estimate of what to expect in terms of 
market insurance in the future EMU as whole.   
4.3.1 Empirical analysis: the experience of the core and non-core countries 
In this analysis, we propose to estimate the different channels through which the smoothing 
of shocks is achieved in the two groups of countries separately. This exercise is based on the 
approach proposed by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and relates to a recent contribution by Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2014).  
Following the methodology of Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998), we 
undertake a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP in order to quantify the share of 
smoothing achieved via the various channels identified above. We disaggregate GDP into 
the following national accounts aggregates: Gross National Income (GNI), National Income 
(NI), Net National Disposable Income (NNDI) and total consumption (C+G). From these 
aggregates, we identify the following channels through which GDP shocks are smoothed 
GDP-GNI =international income transfers (factor income flows)  
GNI-NI = capital depreciation  
NI-NNDI = net international taxes and transfers  
NNDI-(C+G) = total (private and public) net (of investment) savings  
We consider the following identity: (1)	ܩܦ ௜ܲ = ܩܦ ௜ܲܩܰܫ௜ ܩܰܫ௜ܰ݅௜ ܰ݅௜ܰܰܦܫܰܰܦܫ௜ܥܱܰ ௜ܵ ∗ ܥܱܰ ௜ܵ 
Taking the first difference and transforming (1) into a logarithm, we obtain the following five 
equations, which come down to a simple variance decomposition of GDP into five factors: 33 
ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ:	∆ log	ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ −	∆ logܩܰܫ௜,௧			= 	 ܽ௧௜௙ + ߚ௜௙∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ + ߝ௜,௧			 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	݀݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊:	∆ log 	ܩܰܫ௜,௧ 	 	− 	∆ logܰܫ௜,௧		= 	 ܽ௧ௗ + ߚௗ∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ + ߝ௜,௧			 
                                                   
30 It should also be added that Germany and its surrounding countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Austria) are also economically (production and trade) very integrated. 
31 Unfortunately, data on capital market integration among countries are not readily available and 
building an indicator of it would be methodologically challenging.  
32 Of course, these countries did not have common supervision or resolution mechanisms. 
33 See Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) for a detailed derivation. 
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ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݂݁ݎݏ:	∆ logܰܫ௜,௧ − ∆ logܰܰܦܫ௜,௧ 	= 	 ܽ௧௧ + ߚ௧∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧			 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݊݁ݐ	ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏ:	∆ logܰܰܦܫ௜,௧ 	− 	∆ logܥܱܰ ௜ܵ,௧= 	 ܽ௧௦ + ߚ௦∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧			 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݌ݐ݅݋݊:	∆ logܱܶܶ	ܥܱ ௜ܰ,௧ = 	 ܽ௧௖ + ߚ௖∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧					 
ܽ௧			denotes the time-fixed effects, the ߚ௦ capture the percentage of smoothing achieved by the 
different smoothing channels and ߝ௜,௧			 is the error term. Note that no constant is included in 
the estimation. These equations aim to capture how GDP shocks propagate through the 
economy. The sum of all βs, for a certain time, equals one by construction. In particular, if ߚ௖= 
1 (the coefficient for consumption), the impact of a shock to GDP is fully absorbed by 
consumption, meaning that no risk sharing takes place. Conversely, if ߚ௖= 0 risk-sharing 
mechanisms provide full stabilisation to a shock, with no impact on consumption.  
All data are from the OECD national accounts database and are measured in per capita (real) 
terms. We consider a panel of 11 countries that were part of the euro area in 201434 over the 
period 1990-2014. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of risk-sharing mechanisms during 
the pre-crisis years (1990-2007), the global financial crisis (namely 2008-09) and the euro area 
crisis (2010-14), we allow the coefficients to vary by interacting the GDP shocks with dummy 
variables for the three different time-periods. Moreover, in the same vein as Kalemli-Ozcan 
(2014), we further interact the GDP shocks with dummies for the core and non-core country 
groups, which allows us to test our initial hypothesis. Therefore, the general equations 
presented above are extended in the following way (here with the example of international 
factor income on the left hand side):  
∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ −	∆ logܩܰܫ௜,௧ =	 	ܽ௧ 	+	ߚ௖௢௥௘	ଽ଴ି଴଻∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧ଽ଴ି଴଻ ∗ܦ௜,௧஼௢௥௘+ ߚே௢௡ି஼௢௥௘	ଽ଴ି଴଻∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧ଽ଴ି଴଻ ∗ܦ௜,௧ே௢௡ି஼௢௥௘ 		+ 	ߚ஼௢௥௘	଴଼ି଴ଽ∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧଴଼ି଴ଽ ∗ܦ௜,௧஼௢௥௘+ 	ߚே௢௡ି஼௢௥௘	଴଼ି଴ଽ∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧଴଼ି଴ଽ ∗ܦ௜,௧ே௢௡ି஼௢௥௘+ 	ߚ௖௢௥௘	ଵ଴ିଵଷ∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧ଵ଴ିଵଷ ∗ܦ௜,௧஼௢௥௘+ 	ߚே௢௡ି௖௢௥௘	ଵ଴ିଵଷ∆ logܩܦ ௜ܲ ,௧ ∗ ܦ௜,௧ଵ଴ିଵଷ ∗ܦ௜,௧ே௢௡ି஼௢௥௘ + 	 ߝ௜ ,௧ 
We thus estimate five equations, with each of them distinguishing between the three key 
time- periods and core and non-core countries. This leads to six series (rows) of estimates, 
which we report in Table 1.  
Table 1. Core vs. non-core estimates 
Core versus Non-
Core Net savings 
International 
factor 
income 
K 
depreciation 
International 
transfers 
Unsmoothed 
(consumption
) 
Core (1990-2007) 0.63*** -0.06* -0.12*** 0.03** 0.52*** 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
Core (2008-09) 0.61*** 0.26*** -0.05 -0.00 0.18 
(0.19) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.14) 
Core (2010-2014) 0.72*** -0.06 -0.13*** -0.07 0.54*** 
(0.23) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) 
                                                   
34 Some countries were not included due to data unavailability. We have left out Cyprus and 
Luxembourg, given the special features of their banking sectors. 
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Non-core (1990-2007) 0.24*** 0.09** -0.01 0.03** 0.65*** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Non-core (2008-09) 0.38*** -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.65*** 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) 
Non-core (2010-14) 0.12* 0.03 -0.11*** 0.01 0.94*** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.19 0.56 0.14 0.88 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Core= Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland and France; non-CORE= Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland.  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on OECD national accounts data (2015). 
 
Figures 6 and 7 visualise the result of the table, for an easier reading. 
Figure 6. Core countries: decomposition (1997-
2014) 
 
Figure 7. Non-core countries: decomposition 
(1997-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on OECD national accounts data (2015). 
 
Overall, the unsmoothed impact of the shocks, as measured by the consumption coefficient, 
is much larger in the non-core countries than in the core group of countries across each 
period. GDP loss absorption seems to have worked particularly well in the core countries 
during the global financial crisis, when the part of impact of the shocks remained 
unsmoothed is below 20% (and statistically non-different from zero). In the non-core 
countries, the shock absorption collapsed after 2010, with the shock on GDP almost fully 
reflected in consumption (more than 90%). The estimates also suggest that both in core and 
in peripheral countries, the credit channel has been the only one to mitigate the effect of 
shocks on consumption, through savings and borrowing. Not surprisingly, this channel has 
worked in a much more powerful way in the core countries, where savings were larger than 
in the periphery. 35  
                                                   
35 In this setting, the unsmoothed part of the shock will affect total consumption, both public and 
private. It is possible to decompose the so-called credit (or better saving)  channel distinguishing 
private and public sector, so to measure the effect of the shock on private consumption only and to 
capture the role of fiscal policy as consumption smoothing mechanism. Because of data availability, 
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With one exception, international factor income is either insignificant or very small and with 
an unexpected negative sign. International factor income smoothed 26% of the shocks in the 
non-core countries during the years of the global financial crisis (2008-2009): it is the only 
case where capital markets seem to have provided some loss-absorption capacity. It is 
interesting to note that when Finland is taken out from the core group, given the crisis it 
experienced, the positive and significant coefficient of the factor income over the period 
2008-09 becomes statistically insignificant. This would suggest that the factor income channel 
has been particularly relevant for Finland. The result is consistent with the story that Nokia, 
which was at the origin of the crisis, was not fully owned domestically and the losses of the 
collapse were shared with other countries. 
Overall, assuming that the factor income channel is properly measured, even the countries 
that remained financially integrated and exhibited strong trade linkages showed, only 
occasionally, a limited capacity for real market risk sharing: at best, the effect of shocks on 
consumption was smoothed over time through changes in the composition of demand 
(investment and savings) /or international borrowing.  
Table 2 reports the estimates for the different channels for all 11 countries, without 
distinguishing between core and non-core. The results are very close to those of the non-core 
group, reported in Table 1, which seems to drive the main dynamics, over each of the 
periods considered. Accordingly, the impact of the shock on aggregate consumption is very 
large, especially after 2010, and credit markets have only had a limited role in smoothing the 
impact of the shock.    
Table 2. Pooled estimates (all countries) 
All Net savings 
International 
factor 
income 
K 
depreciation 
International 
transfers 
Unsmoothed 
(consumption) 
1990-2007 0.35*** 0.05 -0.04** 0.03** 0.61*** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
2008-2009 0.42*** 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.56*** 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) 
2010-2014 0.17** 0.03 -0.11*** 0.01 0.91*** 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.11 0.48 0.13 0.86 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on OECD national accounts data (2015). 
It should be noted, that beyond the broader discussion on the validity or not of the 
assumption that output shocks are fully exogenous, assessing the quality of capital market 
risk-sharing through international factor income has two limitations that may result in a mis-
estimation of the level of risk sharing between the groups of countries under consideration. 
First, net international factor income, as measured above, is not related to the degree of risk 
                                                                                                                                                               
this decomposition is only possible after 1997. In order to present results from 1990, we do not display 
this additional decomposition. In broad terms, the simple regressions we run suggest that fiscal policy 
payed a limited role in the core countries and no role in the periphery. This topic deserves more in-
depth analysis. 
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sharing occurring within a specific group of countries (i.e. within the core and non-core). It 
would be correct if the euro area were a closed economy. In reality, it captures the level of 
risk sharing of each of the countries compared with the rest of the world. As argued by 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2010), it is likely that the risk sharing properties of assets held outside 
Europe are very relevant since business cycles tend to be increasingly correlated in the euro 
area. This implies that the risk-sharing capacity of the euro area, as measured by 
international factor income is overestimated. However, Balli et al. (2012) remark that 
measuring only capital income overlooks capital gains, which are another important source 
of risk sharing through capital markets. This would suggest that factor income is, in reality, 
underestimating the risk sharing capacity of capital markets. 
4.3.2 The role of cross-border equity during banking crises: The BELLS vs. Spain and 
Ireland 
In order to consider further how financial market features influence risk-sharing, we extend 
the analysis above by looking at the risk sharing that occurred through international factor 
income, focusing on a group of countries, that up to 2008, experienced large inflows of 
capital, in some case combined with bubbles, and then a sudden stop in lending. These are 
Ireland and Spain on the one hand, and the Baltic States and Bulgaria (BELL) on the other. 
The Baltics only recently joined EMU, but at the time the crisis erupted, similarly to Bulgaria, 
they had in place a currency board, or hard peg agreements, which make them similar to 
euro-area countries to the extent that they could not use the exchange rate as a safety valve.36  
A very specific and dominant feature of the BELL banking system is that it is mainly 
composed of subsidiaries from foreign banks (about 80%).37 This can be seen as an extreme 
case of cross-border ownership and a possible interpretation of it is that banks in these 
countries are de facto part of a ‘private’ banking union (with parent banks in foreign 
countries). Moreover, since the national central banks were greatly constrained by the 
exchange rate regime in the provision of liquidity to support their banking systems during 
the crisis, the BELL experience can provide a lower-bound proxy of the BU. It is interesting 
to note that despite the magnitude of the losses incurred by the banking system; only one 
(domestic) bank had to be rescued over the crisis – the only large domestic Latvian bank.  
                                                   
36 See Gros and Alcidi (2015). 
37 Ibid. 
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Figure 8. BELL (Baltic states + Bulgaria): International factor income and GDP fluctuations during 
the crisis 
 
Source: Authors‘ own elaboration, based on Ameco data, European Commission, 2016. 
Figure 8 attempts to roughly illustrate the amount of risk-sharing that occurred through 
international factor income in the BELL, by plotting fluctuations in GDP and in international 
factor income.38 The two variables exhibit a positive correlation (which is analogous to the 
positive regression coefficient in Table 1) during the worst phase of the crisis, suggesting that 
international factor income was working as risk sharing. In particular, the latter fell into a 
negative area in 2008 and 2009 when GDP collapsed. The numbers suggest that some 20% of 
GDP losses were absorbed by international factor income, in practice losses borne by mother 
banks and groups outside the region. 
Similar to Figure 9, Figure 10 shows GDP and international income factor fluctuations for 
Ireland (left-hand side) and Spain (right-hand side). Unlike for the BELL, the correlation sign 
is less clear-cut. In Ireland, the income factor exhibits much higher volatility than in Spain 
and the correlation with GDP has a negative sign in 2009 and in 2013-14, suggesting that 
instead of providing cross-border loss-sharing, the factor income reinforced (or was driven 
by) the cycle. In Spain, the correlation is clearly positive most of the time, and between 2009 
and 2013, the international income factor seems to have provided some loss-absorption 
capacity. In this respect it is interesting to recall that, as argued above, the Spanish banking 
sector has always been highly segmented with small local banks and large international 
banks seriously exposed to foreign markets, most notably Latin America. This may have 
helped in absorbing GDP losses.   
                                                   
38 Given the small sample, it is impossible to conduct an econometric analysis.  
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Figure 9. International factor income (change as % of GDP) and GDP growth, 2007-15, Ireland 
(LHS) and Spain (RHS) 
  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Ameco data, European Commission, 2016.  
Overall, the findings seem to point to the fact that a CMU, which is expected to favour cross-
border ownership of capital, could play a role in reinforcing the very weak factor income 
channel. However, market risk sharing should not be expected to reach the range estimated 
for the US in the medium run, and requires more than harmonisation of regulations to reach 
such levels.   
5. Centralised fiscal insurance and private risk sharing: substitutes 
or complements? 
We distinguish at least two readings of the literature discussed above in terms of what 
financial integration, driven by the BU and the CMU, could achieve in the area of risk 
sharing, and hence the need for a fiscal risk-sharing device. On the one hand, because of the 
nature of past financial integration and the fact that crises tend to affect the credit channel 
(e.g. sudden withdrawal), strengthening capital market integration would yield large 
benefits.39 Unlike the credit channel, the capacity of capital markets for risk sharing during 
(asymmetric) downturns is expected to remain strong if ownership of capital is highly 
diversified40. According to this line of reasoning, the large gap in the degree of risk sharing 
through capital markets between the EU and existing federations suggests a high potential 
for further financial integration gains.   
On the other hand, there is no clear evidence that the financial integration that took place 
since the inception of EMU has fostered private risk sharing. In fact, there is evidence that 
shocks are least absorbed during major downturns such as the euro-area debt crisis. While 
the BU and the CMU may contribute to a more resilient financial integration based on 
market instruments, and could reinforce the effectiveness of banking intermediation, it 
                                                   
39 See, for instance, Hoffman and Sørensen (2012). 
40 This requires that the returns on assets held abroad are uncorrelated with country’s domestic cycle. 
If this is not the case there is no scope of diversification and hence risk sharing.  
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remains to be seen to what extent this would ever lead to a substantial degree of risk-sharing 
capacity. In this respect, an important question relates is whether improved knowledge of, 
and trust in, foreign individuals and institutions41 is a necessary condition for a well-
functioning market risk sharing in the euro area. A second question is how other paths of 
integration, for instance common fiscal insurance, can interact with and affect private risk 
sharing mechanisms.  
The rest of this section seeks ask whether fiscal and private risk sharing are substitutes, or 
rather complementary instruments for responding and adapting to shocks.  
5.1.1 Rationale for fiscal insurance 
The recent debate on EMU economic governance has largely focused on how to foster the 
counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. One option would be to increase the flexibility of fiscal 
rules to allow more room for national governments to face the cycle. This is currently 
happening, at least to a certain extent, but at the cost of breaking the credibility of rules. 
Another option is to consider the possibility of centralised resources for income stabilisation 
purposes.  
Conceptually, the argument for a (supranational) fiscal capacity or insurance at central level, 
such as an EUBS, goes even beyond the capacity, constrained or not, of national policy 
makers to address country-specific shocks. Indeed, the rationale for common fiscal 
instruments is linked to the notion of externality in a monetary union, which implies that a 
shock in one country can spill over other countries given the existing tight links (commercial, 
financial and monetary) among them.42 In fact, this is also the economic rationale for 
coordinating national fiscal policies. The key practical distinction is that fiscal insurance at 
central level would operate ex-ante, and would have the double objective of relieving a 
country hit by a shock from the costs it entails domestically and avoiding that the shock 
amplify and be transmitted to other countries. 
The key policy and political issue is whether fiscal insurance is a substitute or a complement 
for market insurance mechanisms. 
5.1.2 Fiscal and market insurance: Substitute or complement? 
The question is as important as it is difficult to answer. Both economic theory and empirical 
evidence on the interaction between the market and fiscal mechanisms are scant.  
From a theoretical point of view, one answer to this question can be found in Fahri and 
Werning (2012). They argue that even under the assumption of complete financial markets, 
the level of risk sharing achieved through private markets is not Pareto efficient. The main 
reason for this is that private agents do not purchase efficient amounts of private insurance 
because they do not internalise the positive externalities from the macroeconomic 
stabilisation effects of their portfolio choices. Under this assumption, a fiscal insurance 
mechanism would be the response to a market failure and lead to a Pareto superior outcome. 
This conclusion points to a complementary role for an (ex-ante) fiscal risk-sharing 
                                                   
41 Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2007) find that variables related to social capital provide 
further insight into patterns of private risk sharing in the EU. They point out that this kind of obstacles 
to risk sharing may be harder to overcome than formal barriers to economic and financial integration. 
42 For a review of the literature on the spillover effect in a monetary union, see Alcidi et al. (2015).  
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mechanism, which goes beyond crisis times when fiscal intervention can compensate for the 
ineffectiveness of credit markets in smoothing. This argument embeds the idea that fiscal 
and market channels are not independent, and fiscal risk sharing could act as a catalyst 
towards the provision of higher market risk sharing. To put it simply, if investors knew that 
the government was providing a minimum level of insurance against negative shocks, they 
might be more willing to provide more insurance through market-based mechanisms. This 
hypothesis has powerful intellectual implications and goes in the direction of arguments 
often used in behavioural economics; however, it is very difficult to test empirically.   
In terms of empirical evidence, one of the few works openly addressing the question of the 
interaction between risk-sharing channels is that of Asdrubali and Kim (2004). They look at 
the US, the OECD and the EU over the period 1960/63 to 1990 using a dynamic approach 
(panel VAR) to analyse the interaction between risk sharing (fiscal or through financial 
markets) and inter-temporal consumption smoothing (through the credit market) channels. 
The first finding is that the capital markets and fiscal risk-sharing channels tend to be 
complementary. The second finding is that they tend to crowd out (or to reduce the role of) 
the credit channel. This is an important result given that the effectiveness of the credit 
channel varies with the cycle. They also find that a positive shock to capital markets would 
crowd out credit market smoothing (almost completely in the US and partially in the OECD). 
This would mean that the capital markets union could be expected to increase shock 
smoothing through the market and reduce consumption smoothing through credit. 
Similarly, they also find that a shock to fiscal stabilisers, like a European unemployment 
insurance scheme, would be expected to crowd out the credit market channel (in the OECD 
as a whole, but not in the US).  
The main explanation for these results is that since capital markets and fiscal mechanisms 
work as insurance, hence ex-ante, they are not “exposed” to the crowding-out effect. In 
contrast, credit markets are a tool for consumption smoothing, and work only ex-post, once 
the shock has occurred, and if other channels are not working.    
This last point is relevant also in view of the interpretation of the empirical findings shown 
in the previous section, which show that in the euro area risk sharing via capital markets is 
very small, fiscal insurance is inexistent and credit markets are the main channel for 
adapting to shocks. Given the limits of the credit channel in terms of its ineffectiveness 
during downturns and incapacity to cope with permanent shocks, boosting the role of both 
market and fiscal insurance may be desirable. 
All findings, theoretical and empirical, point to the conclusion that market insurance 
mechanisms should be accompanied by some degree of fiscal insurance. This would boost 
market risk sharing and reduce the reliance on saving and borrowing to adapt to the shock. 
The fact that federations like the US and Germany, which exhibit a higher fiscal risk-sharing 
than other countries/regions, also have a higher degree of market risk-sharing, may not just 
be a consequence of specific features of financial markets. 
Furthermore, it should be considered that shocks of different natures operate in different 
ways. Financial shocks (e.g. credit bubbles) and output (real economy, sectoral) shocks 
usually hit upfront different sectors upfront (banking and other industries, respectively) and 
tend to propagate into the rest of the economy, and possibly across countries, through 
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different channels, mostly through financial/banking exposure and production and 
commercial linkages.  
Figure 10 attempts to illustrate the idea that when a negative shock occurs, fiscal and market 
risk-sharing mechanisms intervene upfront (or even in a preventive fashion as they both 
have an ex-ante nature) depending on the nature of the shock.  
If the shock hits a particular industry, one would expect a disequilibrium to emerge in the 
labour market. Fiscal insurance (e.g. unemployment scheme) is meant to respond directly to 
it, while market mechanisms are expected to intervene when the shock is transmitted to the 
banking and the broader financial sector. In principle, the existence of the fiscal insurance 
should smooth the shock before it is transmitted. In a similar vein, when a financial shock 
hits, market insurance mechanisms are expected to react upfront to the disequilibria in 
capital markets, and to smooth/absorb part of the shock before it propagates to the rest of 
the economy. Thus, ex-ante insurance should prevent banking exposures and capital flows 
from amplifying the shock. Fiscal risk sharing, in principle, occurs once the shock has 
reached the real economy and reduces the impact of further feedback effects. 
Figure 10 Fiscal and market insurance mechanisms: Substitute or complement? 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In this case, the role of the Banking Union is likely to be limited, but the Capital Markets 
Union could help to prevent the burden of the losses being concentrated in one country. This 
is indeed what happened in the case of Nokia, whose shareholders were not concentrated in 
Finland. Of course, the overall impact depends crucially on whether the shock is temporary 
or permanent. In the latter case, adjustment in relative prices may be unavoidable, even in 
the presence of fiscal insurance. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
In a monetary union, the impact of country-specific shocks can be smoothed through 
different channels: i) countercyclical national fiscal policy, ii) labour mobility, iii) market 
mechanisms, namely risk-sharing through access to international capital markets and inter-
temporal consumption smoothing through credit markets, as well as iv), when it exists, a 
central/federal fiscal insurance mechanism.  
We acknowledge that for a variety of reasons (including the imperfect design of fiscal rules, 
high levels of debt, a lack of/excessive market discipline, and even arguments over political 
economy) fiscal policy tends to be pro-cyclical over time and across countries. Because of 
this, the hypothesis that national policies alone can deal with asymmetric shock is not 
realistic. We also acknowledge that while labour mobility is in theory an important channel 
for adapting to asymmetric shocks, in practice, it has had only a limited effect and this is 
unlikely to change in the future.  
Against this background, the paper has mostly focused on market mechanisms. Indeed their 
role is likely to change in the medium term but how exactly is not clear. 
According to the qualitative arguments presented above, as well the estimates shown in the 
previous sections, the stabilisation capacity of a region in the face of shocks is difficult to 
identify and measure, and it can vary over time, as well as according to the state of the 
economy. In the case of the EU, this observation seems particularly relevant.  
Table 3 summarises the main conclusions that emerge from the previous sections. 
Table 3. Shock-smoothing capacity, before and after EU reforms 
 Normal times Crisis times Normal times Crisis times 
 Before 
EU broad 
governance 
reforms 
Before 
EU broad 
governance 
reforms 
After 
EU broad 
governance 
reforms 
After 
EU broad 
governance 
reforms 
National fiscal 
policy 
Often pro-cyclical Often pro-cyclical Less pro-cyclical Less pro-cyclical 
Labour mobility Very limited Larger Very limited Larger 
Risk-sharing via 
capital markets 
Very low Very low Improved, but 
likely to remain 
limited  
Improved, but 
likely to remain 
limited 
Consumption 
smoothing 
Key market 
channel, about 
20% – up to 60% 
for some 
countries  
Lower than in 
normal times, it 
can go to zero 
Same Possibly 
improved (less 
financial 
fragmentation) 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration (based on preceding analysis). 
We expect that the adaptability and capacity to respond to shocks will be affected by the 
governance reforms and in particular by the completion of the BU, with a European deposit 
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insurance scheme and a backstop for the single resolution fund, as well as advancement in 
the CMU.  
Overall, the new elements are likely to improve the capacity of the system to deal with 
asymmetric shocks and possibly to reduce their occurrence, but this should remain limited in 
the medium term and certainly smaller than in the US. The main reason for this is that the 
current degree of market insurance is so small that any dramatic change seems quite 
unrealistic in the near future. Moreover, some elements of the economic literature suggest 
that the capacity of markets to deliver risk sharing is not independent of the existence of 
fiscal insurance mechanisms. On the one hand, fiscal insurance, defined as an ex-ante 
mechanism, can affect the behaviour of market participants in catalysing market insurance. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely to negatively affect the functioning of market insurance, for 
two main reasons. First, as they are both ex-ante mechanisms, substitution is, by definition, 
not an issue. Second, market and fiscal insurance should react upfront to disequilibria in 
different markets and crises in different parts of the economy (real economy versus 
financial/banking markets).  
These considerations all together lead to the conclusion that, from a macroeconomic point of 
view, in Europe an ex-ante mechanism for fiscal insurance at central level could improve 
directly and indirectly the adaptability and response to asymmetric shocks and hence income 
stabilisation. 
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